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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court of Appeals correctly apply to this

case its earlier decision holding the three month statute of
limitations for habeas corpus proceedings unconstitutional?
2.

Did the Court of Appeals correctly refuse to

review the entire record in this case for an alternative basis to
affirm when no findings had been made in the district court to
review and respondent's petition clearly raised due process
issues?
COURT OP APPEALS OPINION
The opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case is
found at 862 P.2d 1378.
GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
Respondent agrees that this Court may review this case,
should it choose to, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a).
Respondent does not agree, however, that this Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(g) because
the opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case did not hold any
statute unconstitutional.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW
The following provisions of law control the Court's
consideration of this case and are reproduced in full in Appendix
A:

Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 1; Utah

Constitution, Article VIII, Section 2; Rules 46(c) and 46(d) of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure; Rules 65B(b), 65B(c), and

1

65B(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and Utah Code Ann,
§ 78-12-31.1.
STATEMENT OP THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This case began as a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus from a decision of the Utah State Board of Pardons (the
"Board").

It was filed in the Third Judicial District Court on

February 13, 1992. The district court dismissed the petition as

{

being frivolous on its face on February 20, 1992, because it was
filed after the three month statute of limitations period for
habeas corpus proceedings found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1.

,

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
district court's dismissal because the Court of Appeals earlier
had ruled that the three month limitations period was
unconstitutional.
B.

Statement of the Facts.
Respondent pleaded guilty to manslaughter and was

sentenced to an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years in
prison in July, 1990.

(R. 13) The Board's own guidelines set

the recommended term for this offense at 24 months.

(R. 19). On
4

April 24, 1991, respondent appeared before the Board for an
original parole hearing.

(R. 2, 12) The contents of the Board's

file used in its consideration were not provided to respondent in

I
advance.

(See R. 16-19)

Because respondent had pleaded guilty,

no record previously had been created concerning respondent's
past behavior.

The parole hearing was the first opportunity to

4
2

develop such a record, yet that hearing was so short it only
created a 14 page transcript.

(R. 12-26)

Clear issues were

raised at the hearing whether respondent's crime was intentional
or the result of a severely diminished capacity caused by low
tolerance for alcohol.

(R. 13-16)

Respondent claimed he had no

memory of the crime and immediately called police when he found
the victim.

(R. 13-15)

After briefly questioning respondent and hearing from a
member of the victim's family related by marriage, (R. 13-26) the
Board Chairman stated simply:
Mr. Renn, there's a lot about you that we
don't understand. And you need to know that
we've got to find out more about you before
we in good conscience can grant you a parole
date. We've got to see some activity here in
the institution and we've got to have that
psychological [e]valuation I talked about.
(R. 26)

The Board issued an interim decision to rehear

respondent's case four years later in July, 1995, 60 months after
respondent's conviction.

(R. 26)

On April 30, 1991, without

comment or explanation, and with the admission on the record that
it really did not know much about respondent, the Board modified
the interim decision and issued a final decision that it would
rehear respondent's case seven years later in July, 1998, 96
months after respondent's conviction.

(R. 3, 26)

Respondent filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas
corpus on February 13, 1992.

(R. 2-28)

He challenged the

Board's final decision as arbitrary because no reason was given
for increasing the length of time by three years for the

3

rehearing of his case.

(R. 3) Respondent also fairly challenged

the actual parole hearing.

He attached a copy of the hearing

transcript to his petition and made several interlineations on
the transcript itself challenging the matters that were discussed
and presented.1

(R. 13, 17, 18, 19, 22, 26)

It is clear

respondent did not have the information that the Board would
consider at the hearing prior to the hearing so that he could
prepare to refute the claims. His interlineations in the
transcript challenged this lack of disclosure.

(R. 16-19)

Letters received by the Board in opposition to respondent's
release were not even read into or summarized on the record.

(R.

18)
The district court dismissed respondent's petition on
February 20, 1992 solely because it was filed outside the three
month limitations period contained in Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-31.1.
Appeals.

(R. 35-36)

Respondent appealed to the Court of

On September 30, 1993, that court reversed the district

court based on its earlier decision in Currier v. Holden, 862
P.2d 1357 (Utah App. 1993), which held the three month
limitations period for habeas corpus proceedings
unconstitutional.
On December 31, 1993, in a parallel proceeding
respondent brought in federal court, the United States District
Court for the District of Utah also ruled that Utah Code Ann.
Because respondent's petition is critical to a determination of
whether it raised due process issues, it and the district court's order
dismissing the petition are attached as Appendix C.

4

§ 78-12-31.1 is unconstitutional. Renn v. Noel, Civil No.
93-C-689J (D. Utah, December 31, 1993) (attached as Appendix B)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals did nothing in this case that is
worthy of review by this Court. All it did was apply its ruling
in Currier, which held the statute of limitations for habeas
corpus proceedings unconstitutional.

This could hardly be

considered a departure from the accepted and usual course of
judicial conduct as asserted by the Board as justification for
this Court granting a writ of certiorari.
46(c).

See Utah R. App. P.

Furthermore, because this was not the case that declared

the three month statute unconstitutional, the Court of Appeals1
action did not give rise to an important question of state law
that should be decided by this Court by way of certiorari. See
Utah R. App. P. 46(d).
The Board also challenges the Court of Appeals1 refusal
to review the entire record to find an alternative basis to
affirm the dismissal. The Court of Appeals acted properly
because it did not have a complete record to review.
was respondent's petition and attachments.

All it had

Indeed, respondent's

petition and the Board's hearing transcript that was attached
clearly implicated serious due process concerns that have been
recognized by the Court of Appeals and by this Court, most
recently in Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons. 227 Utah Adv.
Rep. 30 (Utah 1993).

The magnitude of these due process

deficiencies would justify this Court in assuming jurisdiction of
5

respondent's petition sua sponte and ordering a new hearing
before the Board.
POINT I
THE COURT OP APPEALS HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO
REVERSE GIVEN ITS EARLIER RULING HOLDING UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-12-31.1 UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Contrary to the Board's assertions, the Court of
Appeals has the undisputed power under the Utah Constitution to
declare a statute unconstitutional. When it declared Utah Code

{

Ann. § 78-12-31.1 unconstitutional, that statute became null and
void of any prior existence'.. With the three month limitations
period declared void, the Court of Appeals had no choice but to

^

reverse the district court. This is hardly inappropriate
judicial conduct, and it does not raise any important issues of
state law that should be decided by this Court because the Court

.

of Appeals did not declare a statute unconstitutional in this
case.
A.

The Court of Appeals has the Power to Declare Laws
Unconstitutional
Article VIII, section 1 of the Utah Constitution

*

provides that "[t]he judicial power of the state shall be vested
in a supreme court, in a trial court of general jurisdiction

^

known as the district court, and in such other courts as the
Legislature by statute may establish."

(Emphasis added.)

Moreover, "[t]he Supreme Court, the district court, and such

€

other courts designated by statute shall be courts of record."
Id.

The Utah Court of Appeals is a "court of record."

Ann. § 78-1-1(2).

Utah Code
4

6

The "judicial power" includes the power to declare laws
unconstitutional.

This Court declared in Sol Block & Griff v.

Schwartz. 27 Utah 387, 76 P. 22 (1904):
If . . . notwithstanding the enactment was
passed with all due deliberation and
formalities, it be found to contravene
constitutional provisions, or to constitute
an infringement upon the rights of
individuals guarantied by the Constitution,
the courts have the conceded power to declare
void the enactment, as being a violation of
the supreme law of the land. . . . The sole
question in such case is whether the act
violates the supreme law of the state or of
the United States. If it does, it is the
plain duty of the courts to declare its
invalidity.
27 Utah at 392, 76 P. at 23 (emphasis added).

Indeed, five years

later, this Court wrote that "we cannot see upon what theory a
court can refuse to pass upon the constitutionality of the law in
any proceeding where the question is properly presented . . . ."
State ex rel. University of Utah v. Candland. 36 Utah 406, 419,
104 P. 285, 290 (1909).

See also Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch

137, 177-80, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803) (the power to declare
a statute unconstitutional is "of the very essence of judicial
duty" and "the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is
called on to perform"); State ex rel. Richards v. Armstrong, 17
Utah 166, 174, 53 P. 981, 983 (1898) ("[w]here . . . the mind is
convinced of the unconstitutionality of the law, the duty which
devolves upon the court to declare it so is imperative, even
where, as in this case, the statute appears to be in consonance
with justice and humanity." (Emphasis added)).

7

The Legislature has recognized that the Court of
Appeals can declare a law unconstitutional.

It has granted this

Court jurisdiction to review "a final judgment or decree of any
court of record holding a statute of the United States or this
state unconstitutional on its face . . . ." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(g) (emphasis added).

As noted above, the Utah Court

of Appeals is a "court of record."
The Board argues that the limitation on this Court's
power to declare a statute unconstitutional, found in Article
VIII, section 2, logically means that the Court of Appeals has no
power to declare a statute unconstitutional because no similar
limitation is placed on the Court of Appeals' power.
argument misses the point.
mean an absence of power.

This

The absence of a limitation does not
No mention of this Court's power to

declare a statute unconstitutional was ever made in the Utah
Constitution until July, 1985, when the language now found in
Article VIII, section 2 was added,2 yet that such power existed
Prior to the 1985 amendments, Article VIII Section 2 read as
follows:
The Supreme Court shall consist of five judges, which
number may be increased or decreased by the
legislature, but no alteration or increase shall have
the effect of removing a judge from office. A
majority of the judges constituting the court shall be
necessary to form a quorum or render a decision. If a
justice of the Supreme Court shall be disqualified
from sitting in a cause before said court, the
remaining judges shall call a district judge to sit
with them on the hearing of such cause. Every judge
of the supreme court shall be at least thirty years of
age, an active member of the bar, in good standing,
learned in the law, and a resident of the state of
Utah for the five years next preceding his selection.
The judge having the shortest term to serve, not
holding his office by selection to fill a vacancy
before expiration of a regular term, shall be the

8

i s undisputed.

No l i m i t s were placed on the powers of any other

court in 1985.

Prior t o t h e s e amendments, t h i s Court, as w e l l as

the d i s t r i c t c o u r t s , were simply given the " j u d i c i a l power." 3
The l i k e l y reason for l i m i t i n g t h i s Court's power i s
t h a t i t a l s o was given the r i g h t t o s i t in "divisions" for the
f i r s t time in the 1985 amendments.4

In the same s e c t i o n , and

immediately a f t e r the authorization t o s i t in d i v i s i o n s , the
requirement i s made t h a t there be a majority d e c i s i o n of a l l
j u s t i c e s any time the Court declares a s t a t u t e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .
This l i m i t a t i o n makes p e r f e c t sense because t h i s Court i s the
Court of Last Resort in t h i s s t a t e .

Decisions declaring a s t a t e

s t a t u t e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under the Utah Constitution would not be
reviewable by any other court, and d e c i s i o n s declaring a s t a t u t e
u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l under the United S t a t e s Constitution would be
reviewable by way of p e t i t i o n for writ of c e r t i o r a r i t o the

chief j u s t i c e , and s h a l l preside at a l l terms of the
Supreme Court, and in case of h i s absence, the judge,
having in l i k e manner, the next shortest term, s h a l l
preside in t h i s stead.
3

Prior t o the 1985 amendments, A r t i c l e VIII, Section 1 read as

follows:
The j u d i c i a l power of the State s h a l l be vested in the
Senate s i t t i n g as a court of impeachment, in a Supreme
Court, in d i s t r i c t courts, in j u s t i c e s of the peace,
and such other courts i n f e r i o r t o the Supreme Court as
may be established by law.
The pertinent provisions of A r t i c l e VIII, Section 2 as i t now
reads are as follows:
. . . The Supreme Court by rule may s i t and render
f i n a l judgment e i t h e r en banc or in d i v i s i o n s . The
court s h a l l not declare any law unconstitutional under
t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n or the Constitution of the United
S t a t e s , except on the concurrence of a majority of a l l
j u s t i c e s of the Supreme court. . . .

9

United States Supreme Court, but the practical reality is that
few of these decisions would ever be reviewed by that court. On
the other hand# decisions of the Utah Court of Appeals and the
Utah district courts declaring a statute unconstitutional always
are directly reviewable by this Court.

See Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-2-2(3)(g).
The United States District Court for the District of
Utah also recognizes the power of the Court of Appeals to declare
a statute unconstitutional.

<

Following the Court of Appeals1

decision in Courier, that Court also has declared Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-31.1 unconstitutional.

Renn v. Noel, Civil No. 93-C-689J

(D. Utah December 31, 1993) (Appendix B).

(

This order stands

alone from Courier and provides an independent basis to allow the
district court to first consider this case.

.

The Utah Court of Appeals clearly has not only the
power, but the duty to declare laws unconstitutional if properly
presented with the issue. That court declared unconstitutional
the three month statute of limitations applied by the district
court in this case. When this case was then presented to it, it
had no choice but to apply its earlier decision and reverse the
district courtfs order.
B.

When Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 was Declared
Unconstitutional, It Became Null and Void of Prior
Existence

I
When the Court of Appeals used its "judicial power" to
declare Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 unconstitutional, that
statute became as inoperative as if it had never been passed.

In

i
10

State ex rel. University of Utah v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104 P.
285 (1909), this Court wrote that
[a] legislative act which is in conflict with
the Constitution is stillborn and of no force
or effect — impotent alike to confer rights
or to afford protection. This general
doctrine is adopted by the courts generally
and is the doctrine promulgated by the
Supreme Court of the United States, [which
wrote] "An unconstitutional act is not a law;
it confers no rights; it imposes no duties;
it affords no protection; it creates no
office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been
passed,"
36 Utah at 418, 104 P. at 290 (citation omitted) (quoting Norton
v. Shelby County. 118 U.S. 425, 6 S. Ct. 1121, 30 L.Ed. 178
(1886)) (emphasis added).

Thus, the Board's arguments that Utah

Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 could have been applied by the Court of
Appeals to this case, whether as an exception to the doctrine of
stare decisis or based on the notion that respondent's petition
sought a common law writ of certiorari, completely lack merit.
The Court of Appeals decision in Currier made Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-31.1 "as inoperative as though it had never been passed."
The Court of Appeals could not have engaged in any of the
illogical manipulative analyses suggested by the Board even if it
had wanted to.
In sum, the Court of Appeals had the power to declare
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 unconstitutional.

When it did so in

Currier, that section became devoid of any existence, and the
Court of Appeals had to reverse the district court.
so does not merit review by this Court.
11

That it did

POINT II
THE COURT OP APPEALS WOULD HAVE HAD TO
REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT EVEN IP IT TREATED
RESPONDENT'S PETITION AS SEEKING A COMMON LAW
WRIT OP CERTIORARI
Assuming for th€» sake of argument that respondent's
petition sought a common law writ of certiorari rather than a
writ of habeas corpus, the Court of Appeals also would have had
to reverse the district court's dismissal of respondent's
petition.

No time limit currently exists in the Utah Code or the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for bringing a petition for a
common law writ of certiorari or for a petition pursuant to Rule
65B(e), and no provision exists in Rule 65B(e) for a district
court to dismiss a petition as frivolous on its face, as the
district court did in this case.
A.

No Specific Time Limit Exists for Bringing a
Petition for a Common Lav Writ of Certiorari

The Board incongruously argues that respondent's
petition in the district court should be construed as a petition
seeking a writ of certiorari, yet that the unconstitutional three
month limitations period for habeas corpus proceedings should
apply.

Section 78-12-31.1 applied specifically to relief sought

"pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-31.1. By its plain terms, therefore, it did not apply to
actions seeking a writ of certiorari.

In any event, the three
1

month limitations period is void because the Court of Appeals
declared the entire section unconstitutional.
i

12

Respondent would not dispute treating his petition as a
petition for writ of certiorari because no specific limitations
period is found anywhere for petitions seeking a writ of
certiorari.

Indeed, in Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons,

227 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Utah 1993), this Court granted a petition
pursuant to Rule 65B(e) and Appellate Rule 19 that was filed four
and one half years after the petitioner's parole hearing in that
case.
Former Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure may
have applied in the past to create a one-month time limit to
appeal from the Board of Pardons, but that section was repealed
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure still apply to appeals to the
district court from agency action, see Utah R. Civ. P. 81(d), but
no time is provided for seeking review of an agency decision in
district court.
Because no time limits applied to preclude respondent's
petition, the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the district
court.
B.

Rule 65B(e) Contains No Provision Allowing the
District Court to Dismiss a Petition as Frivolous
on its Face

If respondent's petition should be treated as a
petition under Rule 65B(e), the district court erred in
dismissing the petition as frivolous on its face. Only those
provisions of Rule 65B that parallel the common law writ of
habeas corpus contain provisions allowing for dismissal when the
13

petition is frivolous on its face.
and 65B(c)(4).

See Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(7)

Rule 65B(e) contains no such provision. Absent a

"frivolous on its face" provision, a response to respondent's
petition was required to place the statute of limitations at
issue.

Statute of limitations must be raised as an affirmative

defense or be waived.

See Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c); American Coal

Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984) (statutes of limitation
are not jurisdictional and may be waived).

The Court of Appeals

appropriately remanded the case to the district court for further
proceedings because the statute of limitations had not even been
placed at issue when the district court dismissed the petition.
POINT III
THE COURT OP APPEALS COULD NOT EXAMINE THE
RECORD FOR AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS TO AFFIRM
BECAUSE NO RECORD EXISTED AND RESPONDENT'S
CLAIMS IMPLICATED DUE PROCESS CONCERNS
The Board argues that the Court of Appeals should have
reviewed the record in this case on its own to find an
alternative basis to affirm.

The Board is wrong because the

review standard set forth in Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805
(Utah 1988) , requires the appellate court to review "the
findings" of the district court. No record had even been
established in the district court to review other than
respondent's petition and attachments. The Board is also wrong
because respondent's petition raised several valid due process
concerns.

In agreement, the Court of Appeals failure to review

the entire record in this case for an alternative basis to affirm

14

is not a sufficient departure from proper judicial conduct to
warrant review by this Court.
The need for the district court to develop a record
and make findings is emphasized by the procedural facts
surrounding Foote v. Utah Board of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah
1991).

Foote was an original proceeding in this Court seeking

habeas corpus relief from a decision of the Board.

As an

original proceeding, no record had been developed concerning what
happened at the Board hearing.

The petitioner alleged a

violation of due process. This Court wrote that "there is no
question that habeas corpus review of the board of pardon's
actions is available," but "[p]recisely what due process requires
of the board of pardons cannot be determined in the abstract,
[it] must be determined only after the facts concerning the
procedures followed by the board are flushed out."
735.

808 P.2d at

Because no "adequate record" existed to review the decision

of the Board, the matter was referred to the district court for
appropriate proceedings. Id.
The current status of this case parallels Foote in many
ways.

Respondent made or fairly implicated the following claims

in his petition:
1.

Respondent did not have access to all the
information the Board planned to use at his parole
hearing so that he could prepare to refute
negative information.
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(See respondent's

interlineations in the hearing transcript at R.
13, 17, 18, 19, 22, 26)
2.

The Board made its decisions based on a lack of
information about respondent, rather than
sufficient information to warrant a sentence

,

longer than that recommended by the sentencing
guidelines.
3.

(R. 26)

The Board extended its interim decision by three

{

years in its final decision, but it gave no
reasons at all for its decision not to rehear
respondent's case for seven years, four times the
recommended sentence.

,

(R. 3)

These claims clearly implicate due process concerns and
not merely the substantive decisions of the Board.

This Court

recently ruled that a failure to provide inmates with copies or
reasonable summaries of the information to be used by the Board
at the prisoner's original parole hearing so that the prisoner
can adequately prepare for the hearing violates due process.
Labrum v. Utah State Board of Pardons, 227 Utah Adv. Rep. 30
(Utah 1993) . Similarly, the Court of Appeals has recognized that
the Board's failure to provide a written explanation for its
decisions can be a violation of due process.

Preece v. House,

848 P.2d 163, 164 (Utah App,), cert, granted, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah

1
1993).

Basing a parole decision in excess of the sentencing

guidelines on a lack of information about the inmate also clearly
implicates due process concerns because there should be clearly
16

articulable reasons why an inmate should remain in prison longer
than the sentencing guidelines suggest.

The Board had none in

this case.
As in Foote, no record has yet been developed to "flush
out" what happened in the Board hearing in this case.

The Court

of Appeals could not have reviewed the record to make a decision
regarding potential due process violations until a record was
created.

It correctly remanded the case to the district court.
Given that the Court of Appeals simply remanded this

case to the district court for further proceedings, it cannot be
suggested that the Court of Appeals departed from the usual and
proper course of judicial conduct or that its decision created an
important question of state law that should be reviewed by this
Court.

The Court of Appeals simply believed that an adequate

record needed to be created.

Respondent should be allowed to

develop a record and to amend his petition to more artfully state
specific due process violations that occurred, particularly in
light of this Court's recent ruling in Labrum.
POINT IV
THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER
RESPONDENT'S PETITION AND ORDER A NEW HEARING
BEFORE THE BOARD
In Labrum. this court ruled that a prisoner must be
provided with copies or reasonable summaries of information the
Board plans to use at the prisoner's parole hearing well enough
in advance of the hearing to allow the prisoner adequate time to
prepare for the hearing.

227 Utah Adv. Rep. at 34-37.
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The

ruling in Labrum was made applicable "to any inmate who currently
has a claim pending in the district court or an appeal before
this court or the court of appeals challenging original parole
grant hearing procedures on due process grounds."

227 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 37.
This is precisely the type of case Labrum was meant to
apply to. Respondent has raised due process concerns regarding
his original parole grant hearing.

He has fairly implicated the

problems he confronted at the hearing that arose by not being
apprised of what was in this file. He was not prepared to refute
the information in his file and he was not even told what all of
that information was. This is clear from the transcript of the
parole hearing that is part of the record before this court.
This court should assume jurisdiction over respondent's petition
under Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and, based
on Labrum, order that respondent be given a new original parole
grant hearing.
CONCLUSION
The Board's petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.

The Court of Appeals' actions clearly were appropriate

and did not raise any questions worthy of review of this Court.
The Court of Appeals had no choice but to reverse the district
court based on its earlier ruling that the three month statute of
limitations for habeas corpus proceedings was unconstitutional.
Reversal also would have been required if respondent's petition
were construed as a petition for writ of certiorari or a petition

4
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under Rule 65B(e).

Finally, the Court of Appeals acted properly

by remanding for further proceedings in light of the clear due
process issues raised by respondent.

Indeed, the due process

violations obvious on the face of the record now before this
Court are sufficient to justify an order from this Court granting
respondent a new original parole grant hearing.
DATED this 13,. day of February, 1994.

WOOD SPENDLOVE & QUINN, L.C.

Crryv$^JenkiAs
ESrr

Attorneys fox^Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mail, in the U.S,
mail, postage prepaid, four true and correct copies of the
foregoing Respondent's
of Certiorari

Brief

in Opposition

to the Utah Court of Appeals

February, 1994 to the following:
Jan Graham
Utah Attorney General
James H. Beadles
Assistant Attorney General
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
bh:LSJP\OPPCERTIO.REN

to Petition

for

this ^ 2 - day of

Writ

APPENDIX A

78-12-31.1. Habeas corpus — Three months.
Within three months:
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. This limitation shall
apply not only as to grounds known to petitioner but also to grounds
which in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have been known by
petitioner or counsel for petitioner.
History: C. 1953,78-12-31.1, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 133, § 1.

Cross-References. — Extraordinary relief,
Rule 65B, U.R.C.P.

Section 1. [Judicial powers — Courts.]
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, in a trial
court of general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other
courts as the Legislature by statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the
district court, and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of
record. Courts not of record shall also be established by statute.
History: Const 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
S.J.R. 1.

Cross-References. — Courts generally,
Part 1 of Title 78.

Sec. 2. [Supreme court — Chief justice — Declaring law
unconstitutional — Justice unable to participate.]
The Supreme Court shall be the highest court and shall consist of at least
five justices. The number ofjustices may be changed by statute, but no change
shall have the effect of removing a justice from office. A chief justice shall be
selected from among the justices of the Supreme Court as provided by statute.
The chief justice may resign as chief justice without resigning from the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court by rule may sit and render final judgment
either en banc or in divisions. The court shall not declare any law unconstitutional under this constitution or the Constitution of the United States, except
on the concurrence of a majority of all justices of the Supreme Court. If a
justice of the Supreme Court is disqualified or otherwise unable to participate
in a cause before the court, the chief justice, or in the event the chief justice is
disqualified or unable to participate, the remaining justices, shall call an
active judge from an appellate court or the district court to participate in the
cause.
History: Const 1896; L. 1943, S.J.R. 2;
1984 (2nd S.S.), S.J.R. 1.

Cross-References. — Election following appointment to judicial office, § 20-1-7.7.
Statutory provisions, 8 78-2-1 et seq.

\

Rule 46, Considerations governing review of certiorari.
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be granted only for special and important reasons. The following, while neither controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme Court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in
conflict with a decision of another panel of the Court of Appeals on the
same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
state or federal law in a way that is in conflict with a decision of the
Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has rendered a decision that
has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision; or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided an important question of
municipal, state, or federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by the Supreme Court.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amendmen t, effective October 1, 1992, changed the

subdivision designations from numbers to letters.

Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief,
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief
on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful imprisonment), paragraph (c) (involving other types of wrongful restraint on personal
liberty), paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate authority) or paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority and
the failure to exercise such authority). There shall be no special form of writ.
The procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this rule does not provide special procedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by
the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules.
(b) Wrongful imprisonment.
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in a state
prison, other correctional facility or county jail who asserts that the commitment resulted from a substantial denial of rights may petition the
court for relief under this paragraph. This paragraph (b) shall govern
proceedings based on claims relating to original commitments and commitments for violation of probation or parole. This paragraph (b) shall not
govern proceedings based on claims relating to the terms or conditions of
confinement.
(2) Commencement. Except for challenges to parole violation proceedings, the proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition, together
with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the district court in the county in
which the commitment leading to confinement was issued. The court may
order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the
parties or witnesses. Petitions challenging parole violation proceedings
shall be commenced by filing a petition together with a copy thereof, with
the clerk of the district court in the county in which the petitioner is
located.
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims
that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the commitment.
Additional claims relating to the legality of the commitment may not be
raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition shall state:
(A) the place where the petitioner is restrained;
(B) the name of the court by which the petitioner was convicted
and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction
was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner;
(C) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis of which
the petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as the result of
the commitment;
(D) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the commitment
for violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal, and,
if so, the number and caption or title of the appellate proceeding and
the results of the review;
(E) whether the legality of the commitment has already been adjudicated in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and if so
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding.
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach to the
petition affidavits, copies of records or other evidence available to the
petitioner in support of the allegations. The petitioner shall also attach to
the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior
post-conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of
the commitment, and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If
copies of pertinent pleadings, orders, and memoranda are not attached,
the petition shall state why they are not attached.
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed
with the petition.

(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On the filing of the petition,
the clerk shall promptly deliver it to the assigned judge of the court in
which it is filed. Except for challenges to parole violation proceedings, the
presiding judge shall if possible assign the proceeding to the judge who
issued the commitment.
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is
apparent to the court that the issues presented in the petition have already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason
any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall
forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is
frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner.
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of
dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law.
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the petition is not frivolous on its face, the court
shall designate the portions of the petition that are not frivolous and
direct the clerk to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum by mail upon the attorney general and the county attorney.
(9) Responsive pleading. Within twenty days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition
upon the attorney general and county attorney, or within such other
period of time as the court may allow, the attorney general or county
attorney shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition
that have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response
upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days
(plus time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court.
(10) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set
the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. Upon motion
for good cause, the court may grant leave to either party to take discovery
or to extend the date for the hearing. Prior to the hearing, the court may
order either the petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant
transcript or court records. The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the
hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall be present
before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise
be present in court during the proceeding.
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, it shall enter
an appropriate order with respect to the validity of the challenged commitment and with respect to rearraignment, retrial, resentencing, custody, bail or discharge. The court shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, as appropriate, following any evidentiary hearing or any
hearing on a dispositive motion. Upon application of the attorney general
or the county attorney, or upon its own motion, the court may stay release
of the petitioner pending appeal of its order.
(12) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the
petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the petitioner may
proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which event the court may
direct that the costs be paid by the county in which the complainant was
originally charged.
(13) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition
may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme
Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those
courts.

(c) Other wrongful restraints on personal liberty.
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b) of this rule,
this paragraph (c) shall govern all petitions claiming that a person has
been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, and the court may grant
relief appropriate under this paragraph.
(2) Commencement The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a
petition with the clerk of the court in the district in which the petitioner
is restrained or the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is
occurring.
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall
contain a short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the
petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the respondent and the place
where the person is restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the
restraint, if known by the petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of
the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so,
the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding. The petitioner
shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the petitioner
that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a
copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that
adjudicated the legality of the restraint.
(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth
argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may
be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed
with the petition.
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is
apparent to the court that the legality of the restraint has already been
adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in
the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith
issue an order dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on
its face and the reasons for this conclusion. The order need not state
findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order shall be sent by mail to
the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of
the order of dismissal.
(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being
frivolous on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a
copy of the petition and a copy of any memorandum upon the respondent
by mail. At the same time, the court may issue an order directing the
respondent to answer or otherwise respond to the petition, specifying a
time within which the respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also issue an order directing the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the restraint. An
answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has restrained the person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person
so restrained has been transferred to any other person, and if so, the
identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason or
authority for the transfer. Nothing in paragraph (c) shall be construed to
prohibit the court from ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive
motion.
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained will be removed from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the
court shall issue a warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent
before the court to be dealt with according to law. Pending a determination of the petition, the court may place the person alleged to have been
restrained in the custody of such other persons as may be appropriate.
(8) Alternative sendee of the hearing order. If the respondent cannot be found, or if it appears that a person other than the respondent has
custody of the person alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any
other process issued by the court may be served on the person having
custody in the manner and with the same effect as if that person had been
named as respondent in the action.

(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of
the person alleged to be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or
attempts wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction,
the sheriff shall immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff
shall forthwith bring the person arrested before the court to be dealt with
according to law.
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court orders a hearing, the court shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and
shall render judgment accordingly. The respondent or other person having custody shall appear with the person alleged to be restrained or shall
state the reasons for failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct
the respondent to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the
petitioner waives the right to be present at the hearing, the court shall
modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order shall not be
disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the
petition, if enough is stated to impart the meaning and intent of the
proceeding to the respondent.

(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty.
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are
threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) may
petition the court for relief.
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial
functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where
an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed
to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or
(C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person
has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to
which the petitioner is entitled.
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court
may require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to
appear at the hearing on the merits. The court may direct the inferior
court, administrative agency, officer, corporation or other person named
as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript or other record of the
proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance
with the terms of Rule 65A.
(4) S c o p e of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in
nature, the court's review shall not extend further than to determine
whether the respondent has regularly pursued its authority.
(Amended effective September 1, 1991; May 1, 1993.)

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISlOP
3|ea«c4c4c4e4c^ate4e

,. 1? fii '93

BY„

DAVID A. RENN,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 93-C-689J
ORDER

FRANK G. NOEL,
Clwli'MuliU

* * * * * * * * *

The plaintiff filed the instant action against the defendant under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
inter alia, challenging the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992), a statute
imposing a three-month statute of limitations on state habeas corpus proceedings. The matter
was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
On August 25, 1993, the magistrate judge made a report and recommendation that the
plaintiffs' case be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), excepting claims seeking a
determination of the constitutionality of the three-month limitations statute. The report and
recommendation also provided that this action should be stayed pending this court's
determination of substantially the same constitutional issue in Robert R. Gardner v. Michael
Leavitt, et al, Civil No. 93-C-286J, an earlier filed § 1983 case then also pending before the
magistrate judge.1 At roughly the same time, the Utah Court of Appeals issued opinions in
cases of its own striking down § 78-12-31.1 as contrary to Article I, Section 11 of the Utah

On September 16, 1993, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation in Gardner v. Leavitt,
follwed by an amended report and recommendation filed in that case on October 12, 1993.

Constitution. See Larsen v. Jorgensen, (No. 910635),

P.2d

, 1993 WL 412952

(Utah Ct. App. Oct. 7, 1993); McClellan v. Holden, (Nos. 920467 & 930123),

P.2d

1993 WL 377019 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1993)(two consolidated cases).
The report and recommendation filed herein suggests that to preserve plaintiffs
constitutional challenge to § 78-12-31.1, that plaintiffs claim be deemed to invoke federal
and well as state constitutional guarantees, at least for purposes of declaratory relief, and that
to that extent, plaintiffs complaint not be dismissed. However, by Order entered this same
day, this Court has held Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 to be an invalid legislative enactment,
consistent with the Utah Court of Appeals' determination of that issue as a matter of Utah
law. That being the case, a determination of any federal constitutional deficiency inherent in
§ 78-12-31.1 would now appear unnecessary.
The report and recommendation filed herein on August 25, 1993 is hereby adopted as
to the dismissal of plaintiffs damages claims.2 The magistrate judge's recommendation that
plaintiff be permitted to proceed on his claim for declaratory relief based upon § 78-1231.l's invalidity also appears to be well taken. Therefore,
IT IS ORDERED that, with the exception of plaintiffs constitutional claim for relief
concerning Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992), the plaintiffs' complaint is DISMISSED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992) is hereby
determined to be unconstitutional, consistent with the rulings of the Utah Court of Appeals in

With respect to plaintiffs written objections to the report and recommendation, the Court suggests that
plaintiff take the time required to read and understand the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), and the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Van
Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1434 (10th Cir. 1986). Both are referred to on page 3 of the magistrate judge's
report and recommendation as the basis for the position there taken, both have binding precedential effect in this
Court, and both are quite instructive.

2

,

Larsen v. Jorgensen, (No. 910635),

P.2d

, 1993 WL 412952 (Utah Ct. App. Oct.

7, 1993), and McClellan v. Holden, (Nos. 920467 & 930123),

P.2d

, 1993 WL

377019 (Utah Ct. App. Sept. 17, 1993); the stay of proceedings previously imposed by the
magistrate judge is VACATED; and the matter is again referred to the magistrate judge for
further proceedings consistent with this determination.

DATED this ^ 1 day of December, 1993.

BY THE COURT:

BRUCE S. JENKINS
United States District Judge
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DAVID RENN
Attorney Pro Se
Central Utah Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 550
Gunnison, Utah 84634

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DAVID RENN,
Petitioner,
VS.
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.
COMES

NOW

the

*
*
*
*
*
*

PETITION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS AND POST
CONVICTION RELIEF
Case No
Judge l JUDGE FRANK

Petitioner,

DAVID

RENN,

G. NOEL

pursuant to the

following Rule of Civil Procedure:
Rule 65B(b)
Rule 65B(b)
Rule 65B(b)
X Rule 65B(c)
and for cause of
1.

since claim is
since claim is
since claim is
since claim is
action alleges

based on original commitment, jor
based on parole violation, or
based on probation violation, or
based on parole grant hearing,
as follows:

Petitioner is being illegally restrained at the following

location: Central Utah

Correctional

Facility,

P.O.

Box 250,

Gunnison, Utah 84634.
2.

Petitioner was convicted and sentenced at the following

Court: Petitioner is challenging the Board of Pardons.
The dates of the proceedings in which the conviction (or Board of
Pardons decision) was entered are as follows: April 24, 1991.

i()002
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3,

In plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis

of which the Petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as
the result of the commitment (or terms of parole) are as follows:
a.

Petitioner had a original hearing before Heather

Cook of the Board of Pardons on April 24, 1991, wherein the Board
of Pardons scheduled a rehearing for July, 1995 with a full
psychological evaluation prior to hearing. On April 30, 1991, the
above stated rehearing date was modified and changed to July 1998.
Petitioner does not know what constituted the interim decision by
the Board of Pardons to change the petitioner's rehearing from July
1995 to July 1998. There is no consistency and no logical reason
for the July, 1998 date. Prison recommendations were 60 months (795); Board of Pardons decision was 96 months (7-98); Board of
Pardons hearing tape stated 34 months; and Board of Pardons
guidelines indicate 24 months.
b.

Petitioner contends that the guidelines and matrix

for a Board of Pardons release date states 24 months, and also the
tape recording of the petitioner's hearing states a release date
for 24 months. Twenty-four months should be the correct amount of
time.
c.

Petitioner

has paid

all

fines

and

restitution

imposed upon him by the State of Utah the sum of $26,300.65, and
2
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has had no disciplinary problems at the Central Utah Correctional
Facility that would constitute a change in the release date.

To

follow the guidelines.
4.

The

judgment

of

conviction

or

the

commitment

for

violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal.
Yes

X_No

The number and caption or title of the appellate
proceeding and the results of the review are as follows:

It was not appealed because

_X_Question not applicable since this claim concerns a parole grant
hearing for which there is no appeal or administrative remedy.
5.

The legality of the commitment for violation of probation

or parole or the legality of the parole grant hearing has been
reviewed on appeal.

Yes

X

No

If so, the reasons for the

denial of relief in the prior proceeding are as follows:

6.

Petitioner requests that he be appointed legal counsel

based on the attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity.
7.

The

following

documents

are

attached

hereto

and

incorporated herein by reference (check all that apply):
3
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_X
_X

Affidavits that support Petitioner's allegations
Copies of records that support Petitioner's allegations,
Other evidence that supports Petitioner's allegations
Copies of pleadings, orders and memoranda of the Court in
any other post-conviction or civil proceeding that
adjudicated the legality of Petitioner's commitment

8.

Petitioner was unable to obtain and attach the following

documents because

(list the efforts you made to obtain the

documents and the results of your efforts): The Board of Pardons
stated that they lost them.
9.

That pursuant

to URCP Rules

6 5B(b)(12) and

5 4(d),

Petitioner requests that this Court order the Respondent to obtain
such transcripts of proceedings or court records which are relevant
and material to this case and requests that the county in which he
was originally charged be directed to pay the costs of the
proceeding.
10.

(See attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity).

Due to the continuing nature of the illegal restraint,

the statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-31.1
does not bar this action.
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court:
1.

Schedule an evidentiary hearing at which time Petitioner

may be present and represented by counsel.
2.

Permit Petitioner, who remains indigent, to proceed

without prepayment of costs, fees or other assessments.
3.

Grant Petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in
4
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j

PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF
Forma Pauperis, for witnesses and documents necessary to assist in
the proof of the facts alleged in the petition as stated above.
4.

Issue an Order for Post Conviction Relief to have the

Petitioner brought before it, to the end that he may be discharged
from the illegal and unconstitutional confinement and restraint.
Dated this ^7

day of

Zfo*T

, 1992.
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April 24, 1991, Salt Lake City, Parole Hearing
CHAIRMAN:

This is the time and the place for the

original parole hearing for a David Armand Renn; is that
correct, sir?
MR. RENN:

Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN:

Am I saying your last name correctly?

MR. RENN: Yes.
CHAIRMAN: USP number 20173; is that correct?
MR. RENN: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN:

Mr. Renn, we'll be taking testimony from

you today, and we'll need to swear you in, if you'll
raise your right hand.
DAVID A. RENN
was duly sworn, was examined and
testified as follows:
•

MR. RENN: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN:

Thank you.

For the record, we would like

to welcome all those visitors to this hearing.

Board

policy does not allow you to address the board with one
exception, and that one exception by board policy is if
the victim, or in the case if the victim is deceased, a
member representing the victim's family can testify.

And

it's my understanding that we do have, in this case it is
a deceased victim, we have family members present, and

UU012

it's my indication that one of the family members does
want to address the board; is that correct?
UNIDENTIFIED: That's true.
CHAIRMAN:

At the appropriate time I will call you,

sir, to testify.
And for the rest we appreciate your attendance, I'm
sure Mr. Renn appreciates your attendance and support.
Mr. Renn, you sit today before the Board of Pardons
convicted of a serious crime, a second degree felony out
of Judge Tibb's court in Severe County, a second degree
felony of manslaughter, carries a term of 1 to 15 years.
Should indicate that in addition to that lengthy
expiration date which is found in the year 2005, if in
fact you serve to the full expiration, there's
restitution owing in excess of $18,000, and there's a
$10,000 fine,

fatd

/ *s

S~ull

Now, is that all correct to your understanding?
MR. RENN: Yes, sir.
CHAIRMAN:

To the specific case you are originally

charged with the (firstjdegree homicide but pled guilty to
a second degree manslaughter, and the(^first)degree
homicide was dropped; is that correct?
MR. RENN:

Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN:

This crime occurred February 16th, 1990,

in Monroe, Utah.

And this came to the police attention

.11)013

1

after you called the police, indicated to the police that

2

your girlfriend had fallen and needed help?

3

MR. RENN:

Yes, sir.

4

CHAIRMAN:

However, after the investigation by local

5

law enforcement officials, there was clear evidence that

6

indicated that there was a brutal physical beating that

7

caused extensive damage, hemorrhaging, to the victim and

8

because of the head trauma, the victim died.

9

These reports went on to indicate that the severity

10

of the beating took place for a period of time and in

11

fact you had left the victim lying on the floor, had gone

12

to bed and when you woke up at that time summoned

13

assistance.

Now, is that correct?

14

MR. RENN: No, sir.

15

CHAIRMAN:

16
17

Okay.

set the record.
MR. RENN:

This is a good time for you to help

Tell me what happened.

Well, we were drinking, and her having a

o
o

X

18

bad liver was no excuse for drinking because I knew of

19

that, and when I went to bed she was up, getting her

20

stuff ready to leave for California the next day.

21

when I got up in the morning —

22

went to bed.

23

on the kitchen floor in her nightgown, and there was

24

indication of the bathroom — where it looked like she

25

had slipped or fell because they had tooken a faucet

And

o
a.

O

2
<r
o

she was dressed when I

When I got up in the morning she was laying

"U014

1 I where she had had a mark across her forehead.

And it was

2 I all just a mystery, some kind of an accidental death that
3 I is really terrible,,

It's been a real nightmare for nine

4

months now, plus the five months I was on —

5

probation, but bail.

6
7

CHAIRMAN:

If you were innocent, why did you plead

guilty to the manslaughter?

8
9

not

MR. RENN:

Because they talked to me about the murder

charge of five to life, and that scared me because I had

10

never been in any trouble like that before and she said

11

the best way to go to plead, save the state money, and

12

lawyer costs and all this, make a plea bargain for a 1 to

13

15.

14
15

CHAIRMAN:
yourself?

16
17

Were you heavily intoxicated that night

MR. RENN:

We did, I think, drink quite a bit, yes,

sir.

o
o
o

18

CHAIRMAN:

Do you have blackouts when you drink?

u.
2
a.

19

MR. RENN:

No.

<

The only blackouts I'd ever had was

a.
(A
S

s

20

from my high blood pressure medicine.

o

21

CHAIRMAN:

Your history indicates that in the past

22

when you have been drinking, that there has been almost a

23

Jekle and Hyde personality change, and that there's been

24

some violence in the past; is that accurate for me to

25

say?

cc

o

2
X

o
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1

MR. RENN:

There has been some violence in the past

2

to an extent, but most of the time when I drink heavily

3

or not, if I just go off in a corner somewhere someplace

4

and go to sleep.

5

CHAIRMAN:

6

What provokes the violence or the

outbreak?

7

MR. RENN:

I don't know, sir.

8

CHAIRMAN:

There was an indication, and the reason

9

I'm bringing this out is to see if you can help set the

10

record.

11

even though you were not charged with it, that there was

12

an involvement, an altercation with family members and a

13

shotgun.

14

the ground.

15

will help clarify it?

16

But there's indication that in September of '87,

And finally a shotgun shot that was fired into
Can you tell me about that incident that

MR. RENN:

We was having a weekend party out at my

17

place there in Valin (sic), California, and it was

18

getting a little out of hand.

19

there was some drugs there by other people and stuff, and

20

I had gotten into an argument with one of the gentlemen

21

there, and we got into a push shove incident, so I

22

thought if I fired a shot, not at anyone particularly,

23

just at the ground, I could stir them and threaten them

24

to leave the property.

25

discharging a firearm was not the way to get somebody

Everybody drinking and

c
UI

a.
<
a.

c
<
ml

i
o

2

But later on I found out

,mni Q

1
2

escorted off the property. Df$>WISS
CHAIRMAN:

& y

CoO RT~

Was also an indication that in 1988 that

3

there was another serious domestic dispute; is that

4

correct?

5

MR. RENN: Yes, that was another party thing.

6

CHAIRMAN:

7

Was anyone assaulted during that domestic

dispute?

8

MR. RENN: Yesf Sandra was, myself, her.

9

CHAIRMAN:

This is the victim?

10

MR. RENN: Yes, sir.

11

CHAIRMAN:

This problem, this domestic dispute

12

indicated that you and her got into a major altercation;

13

is that correct?

14

MR. RENN: Yes«

15

CHAIRMAN:

You hit her?

16

MR. RENN:

There was push and shove by both parties.

17

CHAIRMAN:

Did you strike or kick the victim at that

o
o
©
2
a.
<
Q.

18
19
20

altercation?
MR. RENN:

At that time — yes, I had stricken her

but I had three fractured ribs also from the incident.

X

O

21

CHAIRMAN:

From her striking you?

22

MR. RENN: Yes, sir.

23

CHAIRMAN:

UJ
J)

<
C

o

I
O

So there was some indication in the prior

24

history that there has been some domestic problems, and

25

even so, assaultive behavior? D/S/n/tt

^y

CLOKJRT

8
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MR. RENN:

Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN:

Okay.

MR. RENN:

For about three and-a-half years.

CHAIRMAN:

She lived with you in California?

MR. RENN:

On and off for a couple of times.

CHAIRMAN:

And when did you move to Monroe?

MR. RENN:

November of '89. She had been here for 12

How long had you known the victim?

weeks•
CHAIRMAN:

Okay.

Should indicate that I have

reviewed numerous correspondence, submitted by both
supporters of you, as well as those that see you as a
serious threat to society

rJorie of them are in between.

They're all either on one side of the fence or the
other. Almost an equal number.

That leaves the board

with some serious concerns because you have to understand
that the main reason that we are sitting in this
position, number one, is to look at society's interest.
Number two, what is just deserts, and then number
three, what's going to be the best thing for you never to
end up back in prison again.
me, you need to know it.

The denial is difficult for

There's a history of it.

The

medical examination and police reports indicated that it
was more severe than simply falling in a bathroom.

If it

was simply that, I have a hard time believing that the
criminal justice system would have erred that bad into a

OU018

plea negotiation that would eventually land you in
prison.
Needless to say, the decision that we have to make
.

bases around both aggravating and mitigating

^J[v£ Bee"// TZ>

7£IA\

O*>

circumstancesrand looking at guidelines.

Tht^

/l/KEAdy

The guidelines

which are prior history with this particular grievous
action, have been computed at 24 months service.
Now, the board can go above that, it can go all the
way to expiration or it can go under it and let you out
tomorrow, based upon mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, but you need to know that there are those
type of circumstances that we need to weigh out.
We would ask Ms. Cooke if she has any questions for
you.
MS. COOKE:

I have a couple questions, Mr. Renn.

County attorney who prosecuted this case said that, "The
victim's body exhibited evidence of the most severe
beating I have ever seen in my professional career" he
says.

And I'm just curious sir, what it was that

provoked an argument so severe that would result in your
inflicting that kind of damage?
MR. RENN:

There was no argument that would create

anything that severe, and I tried to explain to them,
that the same day and the day before this lady had
crashed on a quad racer scooter of mine and when she
10
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1

drank she liked to ride that thing and get crazy.

2

these bruises and a lot of these contusions or whatever

3

you call them was caused by this quad racer, not by

4

myself.

5
6

MS. COOKE:

You mean all that happened before you're

claiming she slipped in the bathroom?

7

MR. RENN: Yes.

8

MS. COOKE:

9

And

I see.

Sir, I'm interested in the

statement that you gave at the time that your pre

10

sentence report was prepared.

11

follow up question about it.

12

whole picture of what happened on that day, what do you

13

see as the most, I'm trying to even find an appropriate

14

word, the greatest damage that came to anyone and

15

everyone as a result of this incident?

16

MR. RENN:

And I want to ask you a
In light of the whole, the

I'm sure to myself and for the family.

17

There's no replacing Sandra and we all know that she had

18

a serious drinking problem and a serious liver problem.

o
a

a.

2

19

MS. COOKE:

Sir, I was interested in your presentence

20

report statement where you were asked to give your

21

version of the offense and consequences of the offense.

22

You talk about what trouble this second degree felony is

23

to you because you're a gun collector and a gunsmith and

24

it's going to take that away from you.

25

about what trouble it is, that the cost of the attorney's

a.
M
X

X

s
3

c
w
a
s

o

And then you talk

1

fees to you and the bail bonds. And I don't see a single

2

statement in that whole paragraph of any hint of remorse

3

for the fact that this woman died.

4

They couldn't feel the remorse that I had

5

and the statement that I've made about the attorneys was

6

I felt they didn't do a just job.

7
8
9
10
11
12

].

MR. RENN:

MS. COOKE:

The attorneys didn't do a just job for

you or for her?
MR. RENN:

To point out really what had happened, the

truth.
MS. COOKE:

And you think that you're the one

suffering from all this?

13

MR. RENN:

14

MS. COOKE:

15

CHAIRMAN:

We're all suffering.
No further questions.
At this time I'd ask you to vacate your

16

seat.

Take this seat right over here, and we'll call up

17

the representative of the victim's family.

18

right up here.

Come sit

o
o

19

Sir, before we get started, you do have the option of

a.

]

3i
]
]

20

making your statement with Mr. Renn present or absent.

21

If you would like him to be absent we would simply tape

22

record your conversation and your testimony to us today

23

and any questions we might ask you, and then call him

24

back into the room and play it back to him.

25

desire to have the inmate leave the room?

You have a

1
2
3

a.

stay here.
CHAIRMAN:

All right.

4

you under oath as well.

5

please.

6

name.

Sir, I'm going to have to put

If you'll raise your right-hand,

For the record would you please state your full

7

MR. GUERREZ: My name is Gilbert E. Guerrez.

8

CHAIRMAN:

9

MR. GUERREZ: Brother-in-law,

10

o
o

MR. GUERREZ: No, sir, we collectively agreed he can

CHAIRMAN:

And your relationship to the victim?
/fboi/f
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And sir, did you affirm that the

11

information you're about to deliver will be the truth,

12

the whole truth and nothing but the truth so help you?

13

MR. GUERREZ: Yes, sir.

14

CHAIRMAN:

15

MR. GUERREZ: My name's is Gilbert Guerrez and I'm

16

representing the family of Sandra Irene ShanJco. Now,

17

this family urges that David Renn not be considered for

18

parole.

19

brutal and sustained.

20

Sandra had, David Renn beat her for a long period of

21

time.

22

to bed and slept.

Thank you, please proceed.

The beating that he gave Sandra was vicious,
To inflict as many wounds as

2

23

Then he left her on the floor to die while he went

David Renn did not call for help until he found

24

Sandra the next morning still breathing.

According to

25

the doctors, Sandra was already brain dead from the blows
13
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1

to her head.

2

myself.

3

human being should be made to pay for his crime and

4

should not be set free.
David Renn's been arrested four times that we know

6

of, the four of us, for assault and assault with a deadly

7

weapon.

8

the 4th time he was in prison because he committed this

9

murder.

3"

Perhaps he was able to get off three times but

Getting by the first three times led to this most

11

horrible crime against mankind, murder.

12

know, but if he had been made to pay for the other times,

13

this last most atrocious crime may not have happened.

14

en
to

A man that can inflict such pain to another

5

10

3
3.

I personally talked to the doctor in Provo

We will never

David Renn has never had a good thing to say about no

15

living person, from me anyway, including his own

16

daughters whom he often —

17

sorry to say this, as pigs, sluts, and whores in front of

18

me and my wife.

he would only refer to, I'm

o
o

]

6
a.
2

]
]

19

He has a brother, and I don't know his name, but who

20

he has said on several occasions that he hates.

David

21

Renn seems to specifically hate women.

22

Renn says about women has always been derogatory.

23

feel that David Renn has been building up to this worst

24

crime, murder, and if he isn't made to pay to the full

25

extent, it's gonna happen again.

Everything David
We

GC

</>

]
]

O

2

(£

O

3
]

14
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1
2

the hospital after the beating.

3

the shock of seeing someone she loved in such a mangled

4

condition.

5

(sic) read the report trying to figure out what happened,

6

and it is not easy for her to accept the fact that her

7

daughter Sandra was taken from her in such a savage and

8

vicious manner.

9

u.
2

<

Sandra's mother Irene Chenholm

We all understand that you can't feel our pain and
sorrow, but all we ask is justice.

11

(inaudible).

13

6

It was bad.

Cos will never get over

10

12

o
o

My wife, Cos Paulene and I saw her sister, Sandra, in

David Renn were to

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN:

Thank you.

Mrs. Cook do you have any

questions?

14

MS. COOKE:

15

CHAIRMAN:

No, thank you, sir.
That's all. Thank you.

Mr. Renn, you've

16

heard the testimony.

I guess one more concern that was

17

pointed had out is the fact that there has been a

18

history, that this doesn't seem to be an isolated case,

19

and that's concerning.

20

valuation in the past, anywhere in your past?

Have you ever had a psychological

a.
so

c

21

MR. RENN: No, sir.

22

CHAIRMAN:

Do you recognize that you might have an

(0

o
2
c
o

23

alcoholic personality that could result to violence?

24

MR. RENN:

I'm aware of that.

25

CHAIRMAN:

Do you see yourself as an alcoholic?
15
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1

MR, RENN:

Yes, I have a —

like to drink.

They've

2

been programing here at the prison since I've been here

3

trying to learn more about alcohol, the affects of it,

4

what it does to you, the depressors or anxiety or

5

hostility or whatever,

6

CHAIRMAN:

Before we go into our executive session

7

and struggle with our decision, is there anything in

8

summation that you would like to say to us before we go

9

into our deliberations?

10

MR. RENN:

11

testimony that —

12

CHAIRMAN:

The victim's family?

13

MR. RENN:

Victim's family congregated together is

14
15

Well, I would like to say that the

pretty far-fetched.
CHAIRMAN:

We'll ask you to be patient, just stay

16

right there in that chair.

17

session and be back.

We'll adjourn into executive

3
d
u.
2

18
19

(Whereupon a recess was taken.)
CHAIRMAN:

We were back on the record.

Before we

a.
J>

x
UU

20

deliver our opinion, we would like to thank everyone for

21

their attendance today and a word of caution to everyone

22

as you exit.

23

this particular case and it would be best for all

24

concerned to just leave those emotions here in this room,

25

and I mean that as strongly as I possibly can mean.

X

o
a.

o
2

There's strong emotions on both sides in

X

O

We
16

«ii)025

3

1

don't want to have any problems after this hearing's all

2

over.

3

Mr. Renn, there's a lot about you that we don't

4

understand.

5

out more about you before we in good conscience can grant

6

you a parole date.

7

in the institution and we've got to have that

8

psychological valuation that I talked about •

And you need to know that we've got to find

We've got to see more activity here

»^-.f.-aM«ff*am*

This is a grievous crime that you've been convicted

9
10

of, the taking of a life.

11

do can put that life back in the frame of that deceased

12

woman•
With all that said, it's the interim decision because

13

3

Nothing we can do or you can

14

it will need to be ratified by at least one more board

15

member, that we're going to order a rehearing and that

16

rehearing will be in(^July of 1995)with a complete

s
o
o
6u.
s

psychological valuation.

17

Good luck to you.

m

18

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.)

19
a.

o

20

Q.

c

21

UJ

<
2
x
O

22
23
24
25
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1 I STATE OF DTAH

)
)

2 I COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

3

5

1/ LINDA J. SKUETHT7AITE, C.S.R., R.P.R., C.P. and

6

NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the county of Salt Lake, State

7

of Utah, do hereby certify:

8

That the foregoing proceedings were taken by me

9

from a tape recording, at the time and place set forth

10

herein, and was taken down by me in shorthand, and

11

thereafter transcribed into typewriting 'jncer my

12

direction and supervision.

13

That the foregoing pages contain i true and

14

correct transcription of my said shortha-d notes so

15

taken.

16 |

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have subscribed my name

17 | this OUT day of
18
19
20 |
21 |

Wu,Ai

LINDA'J. SrlURTHwAITS
'
^C.S.R., RVP<R., C.P. and
Notary Public in and for the
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah

22
23
24
25
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DAVID RENN,

:

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

:

Case No. 920900794 HC

vs.

:

JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Petitioner,

Respondent.

:

Before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
wherein this petitioner has asked the Court to review action
taken by the Parole Board.

Petitioner claims that the Board of

Pardons took action on April 24, 1991 to grant him a rehearing
date of July 1995.

Petitioner further claims that a few days

later on April 30, 1991 the board modified it's earlier decision
and

changed

Petitioner

petitioner's

claims

that

the

rehearing
board

date

gave

no

to

July

reasons

1998.

for the

modification of it's earlier decision and that there is "no
consistency and no logical reason" for the later decision of the
board to grant him a rehearing date of July 1998.

HH034

RENN V. STATE OF UTAH

PAGE 2

ORDER

This Petition is dated January 27, 1992 and was filed in
the District Court on February 13, 1992.
Section 78-12-31.1 Utah Code Annotated provides that an
action for Habeas Corpus must be brought within three (3) months
of the time that the petitioner either knows of grounds for the
petition or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
known of grounds for the petition.

The Court is of the opinion

that petitioner knew or should have known of the action of the
board by at least April 30, 1991 and therefore the filing of
this petition

on February

13, 1992

is barred

by the above

referenced statute of limitations.
Accordingly, the Court hereby dismisses said Petition.
DATED this /£)

day of February, 1992.

FRANK G. NOEL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

.jliOQc;

RENN V, STATE OF UTAH
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Minute Entry, postage prepaid, to the following,
this

<^Q

day of February, 1992:

David Renn
Petitioner Pro Se
Utah State Prison
P. 0, Box 550
Gunnison, Utah
84634
Attorney General
Department of Corrections
Attorney for Respondent
6100 South 300 East
Murray, Utah 84107
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